Unified criterion for security of secret sharing in terms of violation
  of Bell inequality by De, Aditi Sen et al.
ar
X
iv
:q
ua
nt
-p
h/
03
02
15
6v
2 
 2
7 
N
ov
 2
00
3
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Aditi Sen(De), Ujjwal Sen, and Marek Z˙ukowski
Instytut Fizyki Teoretycznej i Astrofizyki, Uniwersytet Gdan´ski, PL-80-952 Gdan´sk, Poland
In secret sharing protocols, a secret is to be distributed among several partners so that leaving out
any number of them, the rest do not have the complete information. Strong multiqubit correlations
in the state by which secret sharing is carried out, had been proposed as a criterion for security of
such protocols against individual attacks by an eavesdropper. However we show that states with
weak multiqubit correlations can also be used for secure secret sharing. That our state has weak
multiqubit correlations, is shown from the perspective of violation of local realism, and also by
showing that its higher order correlations are described by lower ones. We then present a unified
criterion for security of secret sharing in terms of violation of local realism, which works when the
secret sharing state is the Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger state (with strong multiqubit correlations),
as well as states of a different class (with weak multiqubit correlations).
I. INTRODUCTION
Violation of Bell inequalities seem to be a signature of
what has been called “useful entanglement” [1, 2]. It was
shown in Ref. [1] that violation of local realism can be
seen as a criterion for security of secret sharing protocols
[3, 4]. It was argued that a strong violation of multi-
qubit Bell inequalities [5, 6] by the state that acts as the
vehicle in secret sharing can be a criterion for security
of the secret sharing. Violation of local realism was also
shown to be connected with distillability [2] and super-
classical communication complexity [7].
In a secret sharing protocol, the holder of a secret (call
her Alice) wants to distribute her secret amongN−1 sep-
arated parties (call them Bobs, B1, B2, . . . , BN−1) such
that leaving out any (non-zero) number of the Bobs, the
other Bobs would have no information about Alice’s se-
cret. Such protocols were shown to be possible in Refs.
[3, 4], if Alice and the N − 1 Bobs share a large number
of certain entangled states [8, 9].
Such a protocol could suffer from the onslaught of a
possible eavesdropper Evan. Evan could spy (quantum
mechanically) on the channels that carry the states from
Alice to the Bobs and obtain information about Alice’s
secret. In Ref. [1], it was shown that if the secret shar-
ing is carried out by using Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger
(GHZ) states, the secret of Alice is secure from eaves-
dropping as long as the state between Alice and Evan
(after eavesdropping) does not violate any Bell inequality
while the state between Alice and the Bobs (after eaves-
dropping) violates the N -qubit Bell inequalities [5, 6]
very strongly.
In this paper, we show that security of secret sharing
in the multi-qubit scenario can be possible even when the
state between Alice and the Bobs of the secret sharing
protocol contains weak multi-qubit correlations. We ar-
gue that the criterion for security of secret sharing is of
a different type.
(i) The state shared between Alice and the Bobs (af-
ter eavesdropping), if suitably projected into cer-
tain states by all but one Bobs, the remaining Bob
would share a state with Alice, which violates a
two-qubit Bell inequality.
(ii) At the same time, the state between Alice and Evan
must satisfy such inequalities.
We show that both for the GHZ state, which contains
strong multi-qubit correlations (in the sense of strong vi-
olation of multi-qubit Bell inequalities), as well as for
another state (we call it the G state), which in several
ways (as indicated below) contains weak multi-qubit cor-
relations, the security of secret sharing is exactly in the
same range in which both the above conditions, (i) and
(ii), are met. This criterion can therefore be seen as a
unified criterion for security of secret sharing. We sub-
sequently show, that the N -qubit G state cannot have
strong N -qubit correlations. This is in the sense that
(a) the N -qubit correlation functions of the G-state
only weakly violate the multi-qubit Bell inequali-
ties [5, 6] as compared to the GHZ state.
(b) The N -qubit correlations of this state are deter-
mined by lower-order correlations of the state in
contrast to the GHZ state [10].
II. NEW STATES FOR SECRET SHARING
The state
|GN 〉 = 1√
2
(|WN 〉+
∣∣WN
〉
) (1)
can be used for secret sharing, where
|WN 〉 = 1√
N
∑∣∣10⊗N−1
〉
,∣∣WN
〉
= 1√
N
∑∣∣01⊗N−1
〉
,
with |0〉 and |1〉 being the eigenvectors of σz , and e.g.,∑∣∣10⊗N−1〉 denotes the unnormalised superposition of
all N arrays of (N − 1) |0〉s and a single |1〉. Note that
|G4〉 = 1√
2
(|+x〉⊗4 − |−x〉⊗4)
2where
|±x〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 ± |1〉).
However, for more qubits, this family is different than
the GHZ family, as we would show later.
The property of the G state that would help us to use
it for secret sharing is the following:
〈
σ⊗Nx
〉
GN
= 1,
〈
σ⊗Ny
〉
GN
= (−1)M+1, (2)
whenever N = 2M . The first equation follows from the
fact that
σ⊗Nx |WN 〉 =
∣∣WN
〉
, σ⊗Nx
∣∣WN
〉
= |WN 〉 .
To derive the second equation in eq. (2), note that
σ⊗Ny |GN 〉 = iN
1√
2
(− ∣∣WN
〉
+ (−1)N−1 |WN 〉).
The state on the right-hand-side is orthogonal to |GN 〉
for odd N . But for even N(= 2M), the right-hand-side
is −i2M |GN 〉.
Suppose that Alice (A) has some information which
she wishes to secretly distribute among 2M − 1 Bobs
(B1, B2, . . . , B2M−1). But she wishes to distribute it in
such a way that all the Bobs must cooperate to obtain
the message. Leaving out any nonzero number of Bobs,
the remaining Bobs would not be able to gather the com-
plete information about Alice’s bit. This is equivalent
to the situation when Alice is able to secretly distribute
a random sequence of binary digits (bits) to the Bobs
with the same property. Let us now show that this is
possible by using the G2M -state, shared between Alice
and the 2M − 1 Bobs. Suppose that Alice and the Bobs
share a large number of theG2M -state and they randomly
choose between the σx and σy observables to make a mea-
surement on their respective parts of the shared states
[11]. Subsequently they publicly share information about
the bases in which they have made their measurements.
(They obviously do not share information about the re-
sults of the measurements.) They keep only those results
in which all of them measured in the same basis, that is
when either all of them measured in the σx-basis or all
of them measured in the σy-basis. In any run of such a
Bell type experiment, if all the parties happen to choose
σx as their observable, then the 2M results at Alice and
the 2M − 1 Bobs are related by (see eq.(2))
rArB1 . . . rB2M−1 = 1.
If all the Bobs cooperate, then they know that
rA = rB1 . . . rB2M−1 .
If any nonzero number of Bobs refuse to cooperate or are
left out, the remaining Bobs cannot gather the complete
information about rA. This is because irrespective of
what results that any 2M − 2 Bobs happen to obtain
in their σx basis measurements, the state of remaining
two qubits is such that the single-qubit density matrix
at Alice is mixed. Similarly, if all the parties happen to
choose σy as their observable, then the result of Alice is
related to those of the Bobs by
sA = (−1)M+1sB1 . . . sB2M−1 .
In this way, a sequence of random bits is created at Alice
and if there is no eavesdropping, the Bobs (if all of them
cooperate) would be able to reproduce the same random
sequence.
III. SECURITY
We now consider the security of the distributed se-
quence of random bits against a possible eavesdropper,
Evan. We work with the assumption that Evan would
only be able to make coherent but individual attacks.
Thus although Evan may attack coherently on all the
qubits sent to the Bobs (from Alice) in a single run of
the experiment, he is not able to perform joint opera-
tions on qubits from different runs. As has been stressed
in a recent review [12], at present, even individual attacks
by an eavesdropper would be very challenging in reality.
The states that are shared by the Bobs after the mea-
surements by Alice are as follows:
|±x〉 : 1√
2
(|ξ〉 ±
∣∣ξ
〉
)
|±y〉 : 1√
2
(|ξ〉 ± i
∣∣ξ
〉
),
(3)
the left hand column in eq.(3) being the outcome ob-
tained at Alice, while the right hand side gives the cor-
responding state that is shared by the Bobs. Here |±x〉
and |±y〉 are the eigenvectors of σx and σy , and
|ξ〉 = 1√
2M
(
∑∣∣10⊗2M−2
〉
+
∣∣1⊗2M−1
〉
)∣∣ξ
〉
= 1√
2M
(
∑∣∣01⊗2M−2
〉
+
∣∣0⊗2M−1
〉
).
(4)
Note that the protocol for secret sharing is exactly
equivalent to the BB84 key distribution protocol [13],
when we consider the problem of eavesdropping and the
eavesdropping is coherent. Consequently the optimal co-
herent individual attack that Evan (E) can perform, is
given by the unitary transformation [14]
UBE |ξ〉 |0〉 = |ξ〉 |0〉
UBE
∣∣ξ
〉 |0〉 = cosφ ∣∣ξ〉 |0〉+ sinφ |ξ〉 |1〉 , (5)
where B denotes B1B2 . . . B2M−1 and φ ∈ [0, π/2]. Af-
ter Evan implements his attack, i.e., after he applies the
unitary operation UBE given by eq.(5), the state GN of
Alice and the Bobs coupled with the probe |0〉 of Evan
transforms as
|GN 〉AB |0〉E → |ψ〉ABE = 1√2 (|0〉A |ξ〉B |0〉E
+cosφ |1〉A
∣∣ξ
〉
B
|0〉E + sinφ |1〉A |ξ〉B |1〉E).
(6)
3The condition that is needed for security is [15]
I(A : B) > I(A : E), (7)
where againB denotes the aggregate of all the Bobs. This
security implies that Alice and the Bobs can run a one-
way protocol (privacy amplification) if and only if the
condition (7) is satisfied. Here the mutual information
I(X : Y ) is defined as
I(X : Y ) = H(X)−H(X |Y ),
where
H({pi}) = −
∑
i
pi log2 pi
is the Shannon entropy of a probability distribution {pi}.
We would now calculate the mutual information (after
Evan’s attack), when Alice and the Bobs measure either
all of them in the σx basis or all of them in the σy basis.
This happens with equal probability. Therefore in our
case,
I(A : B) = 1− 1
2
(Hx(A|B) +Hy(A|B)).
(As Alice chooses her measurements randomly, H(A) =
1.) The state shared between Alice and the 2M −1 Bobs
(after Evan’s attack) is (see eq.(6))
ρAB =
1 + cos2 φ
2
|α〉 〈α|+ sin
2 φ
2
|1〉 |ξ〉 〈1| 〈ξ| , (8)
where
|α〉 = |0〉 |ξ〉+ cosφ |1〉
∣∣ξ
〉
√
1 + cos2 φ
.
Let us first evaluate
Hx(A|B) ≡ px(B = 1)Hx(A|B = 1)
+ px(B = −1)Hx(A|B = −1), (9)
where for example, px(B = 1) is the probability of the
event “B = 1”, when all the Bobs measure in the σx basis.
Tracing out A from ρAB, the state ρB shared between
the 2M − 1 Bobs is (see eq.(8))
1 + sin2 φ
2
|ξ〉 〈ξ|+ cos
2 φ
2
∣∣ξ
〉 〈
ξ
∣∣ .
Consequently,
px(B = ±1) = 1
2
and from eq.(8),
px(A = 1, B = ±1) = px(A = −1, B = ∓1) = 1± cosφ
4
Therefore
Hx(A|B = 1) = H(1 + cosφ
2
),
where H(p) = −p log2 p − (1 − p) log2(1 − p) is the bi-
nary entropy function. By symmetry, the expression for
Hx(A|B = −1) is exactly the same. So from eq.(9), one
obtains
Hx(A|B) = H(1 + cosφ
2
)
By symmetry, the expression for Hy(A|B) is exactly the
same as that for Hx(A|B). So finally,
I(A : B) = 1−H(1 + cosφ
2
). (10)
I(A : E) is obtained by replacing φ by π/2 − φ in I(A :
B). With these expressions, one can see that the security
condition (7) holds if and only if φ < π/4.
Consider now the state ρAB (given by eq.(8)), obtained
by tracing out the eavesdropper E, after the eavesdrop-
ping. If any 2M − 2 of the 2M − 1 Bobs perform mea-
surements in the σz basis and obtains either |0〉⊗2M−2 or
|1〉⊗2M−2 (cf. [16, 17]), then the remaining Bob (say Bk)
shares with Alice the (two-qubit) state
ρABk =
1 + cos2 φ
2
|β〉 〈β|+ sin
2 φ
2
|11〉 〈11| ,
where
|β〉 = |01〉+ cosφ |10〉√
1 + cos2 φ
.
The two-qubit state ρABk violates local realism if and
only if φ < π/4 [18]. Note that there are no sequen-
tial measurements involved. The parties follow the ordi-
nary Bell-type experiment and classical communication
is needed only to share this data. We consider viola-
tion of local realism exhibited by a subset of this data.
Measurements at the parties do not depend on results of
measurements at the other parties.
On the other hand, the state obtained after we trace
out the Bobs (from the state |ψ〉ABE , given by eq. (6)),
is
ρAE =
1 + sin2 φ
2
|γ〉 〈γ|+ cos
2 φ
2
|10〉 〈10| ,
where
|γ〉 = |00〉+ sinφ |11〉√
1 + sin2 φ
.
The state ρAE violates local realism if and only if φ > π/4
[18].
Therefore for φ ∈ [0, π/4), the state shared (after
eavesdropping by Evan) between Alice and the Bobs vio-
late local realism in the sense described above, while the
Alice-Evan state does not violate local realism. And the
secret sharing is secure in exactly the same range.
4IV. COMPARISON WITH THE GHZ STATE
A related feature was obtained in [1], where secret shar-
ing was investigated by using the GHZ state [19]
|GHZN 〉 = 1√
2
(
∣∣0⊗N
〉
+
∣∣1⊗N
〉
).
However in this case, it was shown that the secret sharing
protocol is secure as long as after eavesdropping by Evan,
strong N = 2M qubits correlations are still present in
the state shared by Alice and Bobs. If secret sharing is
carried out by a shared GHZ state, as has been considered
in [1], the shared state (after optimal eavesdropping by
Evan) between Alice, the 2M − 1 Bobs and Evan is just
the same as displayed on the right hand side of eq.(6)
with the replacement
|ξ〉 →
∣∣0⊗2M−1
〉
∣∣ξ
〉 → ∣∣1⊗2M−1〉 .
Consider the state between Alice and any one of the Bobs,
after measurements in the σx-basis at the other Bobs, and
suppose that either |+x〉 clicks at all those 2M − 2 Bobs,
or |−x〉 clicks at all of them. As can be checked, this
state again violates local realism if and only if φ < π/4.
The state shared by Alice and Evan does not violate local
realism in that range. This is the range in which secret
sharing is secure.
In [1], it was numerically shown that the complete set
of Bell inequalities in multi-qubit systems [5, 6] is violated
by the state shared between Alice and the 2M − 1 Bobs
(after eavesdropping by Evan) by a magnitude of more
than 2
2M−1
2 if and only if φ ∈ [0, π/4). In this range, the
Alice and Evan state does not violate any Bell inequal-
ity. It was therefore proposed that this form of strong
violation of local realism for the 2M -qubit correlations is
a criterion for security in secret sharing.
However we have shown that the range in which se-
curity of secret sharing by a GHZ state is obtained, is
also concurrent with violation of local realism in another
form; that of satisfying items (i) and (ii) in the Introduc-
tion. This feature is also shared by our G states. The
proposed criterion is therefore a unified criterion for se-
curity of secret sharing.
V. STRENGTH OF MULTIQUBIT
CORRELATIONS
The GHZ states have strong multiqubit correlations.
In contrast, the family |G2M 〉, which can also be consid-
ered as the vehicle of the secret sharing, is unlikely to
produce a strong violation of local realism for 2M -qubit
correlations. On the contrary, we will show that it has a
large amount of its entanglement concentrated in corre-
lations of lower number of parties. In the following, we
drop the restriction that the number of parties is even.
A. Violation of local realism
Consider the white noise admixed N -qubit state GN ,
ρGN = pN |GN 〉 〈GN |+ (1− pN )ρNnoise (11)
where ρNnoise =
1
2N I is the maximally mixed state of N
qubits. If N − 2 parties make measurements in the σz
basis, and if either |0〉 clicks at all the parties, or |1〉 clicks
at all the parties, the collapsed state is given respectively
by
ρG2 ⊗ (⊗Ni=3 |0〉ii 〈0|)
or
ρG2 ⊗ (⊗Ni=3 |1〉ii 〈1|),
where ρG2 is the Werner state
ρG2 = p(N→2) |G2〉 〈G2|+ (1− p(N→2))ρ2noise
with
p(N→2) =
1
1 + (1−pN )N
pN2N−2
,
and
|G2〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉+ |10〉).
The state ρG2 has no local realistic description for
p(N→2) > 1/
√
2. This would imply that the state ρGN
cannot have a local realistic model for
pN > p
crit
GN
≡ N
N + (
√
2− 1)2N−2 .
A GHZ state of N qubits maximally violates the multi-
qubit Bell inequalities [5, 6] and the amount of violation
is
√
2N+1. Consequently the noisy GHZ state
ρGHZN = qNP|GHZN 〉 + (1 − qN )ρNnoise (12)
violates local realism for
qN > q
crit
GHZN
≡ 1/
√
2N−1.
But for N ≥ 13,
pcritGN > q
crit
GHZN
.
Thus forN ≥ 13, the nonclassicality of the correlations in
GN is more robust to “white noise” admixture than the
one for the corresponding GHZ state. A similar method
was used in Ref. [17] (cf. [16]) to show that the non-
classical behavior of the W states is stronger than that
of the GHZ state for sufficiently large number of parties.
Note here that the robustness to white noise admixture
of the nonclassicality of correlations in the GN states ob-
tained by the above method is weaker than the one that
is obtained for the corresponding W state.
5Therefore strong nonclassical properties of the GN
states emerge after local projection measurements in
some parties. This strong nonclassicality for lower num-
ber of parties seems to imply that the N -party correla-
tions are weak. One can see this more directly in the
following considerations for the 6-qubit G state, the low-
est number of qubits in which secret sharing is possible
with a G state and which is not simply a GHZ state.
Consider the correlation tensor TˆG6 of the state G6, the
elements of which are given by
Tx1...x6 = tr(P|G6〉σ
(1)
x1
. . . σ(6)x6 ), (xi = x, y, z).
Explicit calculation reveals the following structure of the
tensor:
TˆG6 = ⊗6i=1 ~xi +⊗6i=1~yi −⊗6i=1~zi
+ 13{
∑
(⊗2i=1 ~xi)⊗ (⊗6j=3 ~zj)−
∑
(⊗4i=1 ~xi)⊗ (⊗6j=5 ~zj)
−∑(⊗4i=1~yi)⊗ (⊗6j=5 ~zj) +
∑
(⊗2i=1~yi)⊗ (⊗6j=3 ~zj)
−∑(⊗2i=1 ~xi)⊗ (⊗6j=3 ~yj)−
∑
(⊗4i=1 ~xi)⊗ (⊗6j=5 ~yj)
+
∑
(⊗2i=1 ~xi)⊗ (⊗4j=3 ~yj)⊗ (⊗6k=5 ~zk)},
where for example
∑
~x1⊗ ~x2⊗ ~z3⊗ ~z4⊗ ~z5⊗ ~z6 contains
all the 15 combinations of two ~xs and four ~zs.
A sufficient condition for an N -qubit state ρ to have
a local realistic model for N -qubit correlations (of two-
settings Bell experiments) is that
∑
x1,...,xN=x,y
T 2x1...xN ≤ 1
for any set of local coordinate systems [6]. Here x and
y denote any two arbitrary orthogonal directions, which
can be separately defined for each observer.
For the noisy G6 state ρ
G6 given by the eq.(11),
∑
x1,...,x6=x,y
T 2x1...x6 =
16p26
3
,
for the fixed local coordinate system in which the secret
sharing is considered. Thus an explicit local realistic de-
scription for the (x, y) correlations for the state ρG6 exists
for
p6 ≤
√
3/16 ≈ 0.433012
whereas (for the correlations in the same sector) the noisy
6-qubit GHZ state (eq.(12)) has no local realistic descrip-
tion for
q6 > 1/
√
32 ≈ 0.176777.
The latter follows from the fact that the 6-qubit GHZ
state violates the multiqubit Bell inequalities maximally,
and the amount of violation is
√
25. This shows that
the N -qubit correlations of the GHZ state are stronger
in comparison to that of the G-state. Since the scheme
of the secret sharing protocol is for σx and σy measure-
ments in a fixed local coordinate system, it is probably
enough to check the sufficiency for local realism in the
(x, y) sector. However we show below that the stronger
N -qubit correlations of the GHZ state as compared to the
G state persists even when any local coordinate systems
are considered.
For any set of local coordinate systems,
∑
x1,...,x6=x,y
T 2x1...x6 ≤
∑
x1,...,x6=x,y,z
T 2x1...x6 = 23,
for the state G6. So the noisy G6-state has for sure a
local realistic description for 6-qubit correlations, for
p6 ≤ 1/
√
23 ≈ 0.208514.
Therefore the 6-qubit GHZ state is definitely more robust
to white noise admixture than the state G6 when 6-qubit
correlations are considered.
B. Higher order correlations are determined by
lower order ones for the |GN 〉 state
We would now give yet another argument to show that
the N -qubit state |GN 〉 has weaker N -qubit correlations
than the N -qubit GHZ state. Note that for the GHZ
state, information regarding the reduced density matrices
of lower number of parties is insufficient to describe the
whole N -party state. Indeed the state
1
2
(
∣∣0⊗N
〉 〈
0⊗N
∣∣+
∣∣1⊗N
〉 〈
1⊗N
∣∣),
has the same single-party, 2-party, . . ., (N − 1)-party
reduced density matrices as the state |GHZN 〉. Conse-
quently, high order correlations of the GHZ states are
not determined by lower order correlations. However, as
shown in [10], this feature is rare. For almost all states,
actually the opposite is true.
On the lines of [10], we will now show that for the
states |GN 〉, for N ≥ 5, there is no other state (pure
or mixed) whose (N − 1)-party reduced density matrices
match those of the GN state.
For convenience of notation, let us call the parties shar-
ing the N -qubit GN state as 1, 2, . . . , N . A state whose
(N − 1)-party reduced density matrices agree with those
of GN , may be a mixed state. We therefore allow for an
environment E. Any such state, whose (N − 1)-party re-
duced density matrix of the parties 1, 2, . . . , (N−1) agree
with the state GN , can be written as
|χ〉 = 1√
2
(|v0〉12...(N−1) |E0〉NE + |v1〉12...(N−1) |E1〉NE),
(13)
where
|v0〉 = 1√
N
(
∑∣∣10⊗N−2
〉
+
∣∣1⊗N−1
〉
)
|v1〉 = 1√
N
(
∑∣∣01⊗N−2
〉
+
∣∣0⊗N−1
〉
)
(14)
and |E0〉 and |E1〉 are orthonormal. Note that |v0〉 and
|v1〉 are just the states |ξ〉 and
∣∣ξ
〉
extended also to the
6case of even N (see eq. (4)). Since |E0〉 and |E1〉 are
orthonormal, they can be written as
|E0〉 = |0〉N |e00〉E + |1〉N |e01〉E|E1〉 = |0〉N |e10〉E + |1〉N |e11〉E .
(15)
Let us now try to match the (N−1)-party reduced density
matrix of the parties 2, 3, . . . , N of the stateGN with that
of |χ〉. Consequently, it should be possible to write |χ〉
as
|χ〉 = 1√
2
(|v0〉23...N |F0〉1E + |v1〉23...N |F1〉1E), (16)
where the states |v0〉 and |v1〉 are given by eq. (14), and
the orthonormal environment states |F0〉 and |F1〉 are
given by
|F0〉 = |0〉1 |f00〉E + |1〉1 |f01〉E|F1〉 = |0〉1 |f10〉E + |1〉1 |f11〉E .
(17)
The states on the right hand sides of the equations
(13) and (16) are actually the same states. Comparing
the different terms, it is not hard to see that for N ≥ 5,
|e00〉 = |e11〉
|e01〉 = |e10〉 = 0. (18)
Therefore the state |χ〉, for N ≥ 5, is a product state
of |GN 〉 with a state of the environment, if |χ〉 has its
(N − 1)-party reduced density matrices equal to the cor-
responding ones for |GN 〉. Thus for N ≥ 5, there are no
other N -qubit states whose (N − 1)-qubit reduced den-
sity matrices are equal to those of |GN 〉. Therefore, con-
trary to the GHZ states, given the (N −1)-qubit reduced
density matrices, the state |GN 〉 is already completely
specified. This again underlines the fact that the state
|GN 〉 does not possess strong N -qubit correlations. This
also explicitly shows that the states |GN 〉, for N ≥ 5, are
not from the GHZ family.
VI. SUMMARY
We have given a criterion on security of secret sharing
protocols. The criterion is based on violation in a specific
way, of Bell inequalities (as given by items (i) and (ii) in
the Introduction). A criterion for security of secret shar-
ing based on violation of Bell inequalities was provided
in [1]. Let us mention here that we do not simply extend
this previously known criterion of Ref. [1]. The crite-
rion mentioned in Ref. [1] (call it C1), is not satisfied
by the G-states considered in our paper. And yet secret
sharing is possible by using the G-states. We have put
forward an independent criterion. Our criterion (call it
C2), although again based on violation of Bell inequali-
ties, is drastically different from the criterion mentioned
in Ref. [1]. And we find that both the GHZ state (which
was shown in Ref. [1] to satisfy C1 and useful for secret
sharing) and the G-state (which is shown in this paper
to violate C1 and still useful for secret sharing) are sat-
isfying our criterion C2.
We believe that these considerations would be useful
in the general discussions as well as as for applications of
quantum cryptography [12].
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